By Ugochukwu E. Ikwunne and Olujuwon Olugbemi Obademi

The Supreme Court's decision in Independent National Electoral Commission v Zenith Labour Party (SC/CV/495/2026), delivered on 24 September 2026, has reignited debate over political party membership registers and candidate eligibility ahead of the 2027 general elections.

The controversy centres on sections 77(5)–(7) of the Electoral Act 2026, which regulate participation in party primaries and prescribe the consequence of a party's failure to submit its membership register to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Following the judgment, some commentators have argued that aspirants whose names are absent from the register submitted to INEC cannot validly contest elections.¹

There is, however, an important distinction between a political party's eligibility to field candidates and the personal disqualification of an individual aspirant. This article examines the Supreme Court's reasoning, the statutory framework and the implications of the decision for political parties and prospective candidates.

The Membership Register Regime under Section 77

Section 77 of the Electoral Act 2026 establishes a statutory framework for political party membership registers and for participation in party primaries, congresses and conventions. Under section 77(2), every registered political party must maintain a digital membership register containing prescribed details of its members. Section 77(4) further requires each party to make its register available to INEC not later than 21 days before the date fixed for its primaries, congresses or conventions.²

Sections 77(5) and (6) impose further restrictions. Only members whose names appear on the submitted register are eligible to vote or be voted for in party primaries, congresses and conventions, and a party may not use a different register for those exercises.³ These provisions make the submitted register central to determining participation in internal party elections.

The most consequential provision is section 77(7), which states that a party that fails to submit its membership register within the stipulated period “shall not be eligible to field a candidate for that election”.⁴ The provision therefore expressly attaches the consequence of non-submission to the political party.

Three distinct issues must accordingly be kept separate: the deadline for submitting the register; the eligibility of members to participate in party primaries; and the consequence of a party's failure to submit its register. Although related, they raise different legal questions. In particular, whether the restriction on a party's participation also amounts to the personal disqualification of an individual aspirant requires separate consideration. It is this distinction that makes the Supreme Court's decision in INEC v Zenith Labour Party central to the present debate.

INEC v Zenith Labour Party: Qualification, Disqualification and Exclusion

The central feature of the decision is the Court's interpretation of the consequences prescribed by section 77. The Court held that the provision does not personally disqualify an individual from contesting a general election merely because his or her political party failed to submit its membership register within the stipulated period. Rather, section 77(7) directs its sanction at the party's eligibility to field candidates.⁵

This distinction is key to understanding the judgment. A statutory consequence imposed on a political party is not necessarily the same as a personal disqualification imposed on each of its members. The Court rejected the argument that section 77 creates an additional personal ground of disqualification beyond the constitutional requirements governing eligibility for elective office.⁶

The distinction, however, raises a further question. Although a candidate may not be personally disqualified by section 77(7), the Constitution makes party membership and sponsorship conditions of eligibility for elective office. Sections 131(c) and 177(c), for instance, require presidential and governorship candidates respectively to be members of, and sponsored by, a political party.⁷ A party's inability to field candidates may therefore have practical consequences for the individuals it seeks to sponsor, even though the statutory sanction does not expressly disqualify them.

The critical point is that the absence of personal disqualification does not necessarily resolve every question about a candidate's eligibility to contest an election. The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 77(7) must be distinguished from the further constitutional question of whether, and in what circumstances, a candidate may contest when the sponsoring party is itself ineligible to field candidates. That question calls for careful analysis rather than an assumption that the Court's ruling settles every consequence for individual candidates.

Party Ineligibility and Individual Candidacy: A Distinction Without Practical Separation?

The Supreme Court's distinction between a party's ineligibility to field candidates and the personal disqualification of an individual member raises a significant constitutional question. Although the Court held that section 77(7) imposes its sanction on the political party, the practical effect of that sanction cannot be assessed without considering the constitutional relationship between a candidate and the party through which he or she seeks election.⁸

Nigeria's electoral system does not generally recognise independent candidacy. The significance of party sponsorship is illustrated by Amaechi v INEC, in which the Supreme Court addressed the unlawful substitution of a party's nominated governorship candidate. The decision demonstrates the legal weight of the nomination process and the close relationship between a political party's actions and an aspirant's electoral prospects.⁹

The Constitution expressly requires party membership and sponsorship for presidential, governorship and legislative offices alike. In addition to sections 131(c) and 177(c), considered above, sections 65(2)(b) and 106(d) impose equivalent requirements on candidates for the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly.¹⁰ Party sponsorship is therefore not an administrative formality; it is an integral part of the constitutional framework for electoral participation.

This makes it difficult to treat a party's ineligibility and its candidate's electoral position as entirely separate. Section 77(7) expressly renders a defaulting party ineligible to field candidates, but an aspirant sponsored by that party cannot simply detach his or her candidacy from the party and proceed independently. Even where the aspirant satisfies every personal qualification prescribed by the Constitution, the sponsoring party's inability to field candidates presents a separate obstacle to his or her participation in the election.

The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court is nonetheless legally meaningful, even if its practical consequences are severe. A candidate's personal disqualification is not the same as a party's statutory inability to field candidates. The Court expressly rejected the proposition that section 77(7), by itself, creates a personal disqualification against every member of a defaulting party.¹¹ It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that the Court disqualified such candidates. Equally, however, the absence of personal disqualification does not necessarily confer an independent right to contest where the constitutional requirement of party sponsorship cannot be satisfied.

The difficulty, therefore, lies not in the distinction itself, but in whether it adequately captures the practical and constitutional consequences of the sanction the Court upheld. The immediate legal burden falls on the political party, but the consequence may extend to aspirants whose participation depends entirely on that party's ability to field them. The party may be the direct subject of the statutory sanction; its candidates may nonetheless bear its electoral consequences.

It is submitted that the judgment should accordingly be understood in two dimensions. First, section 77(7) imposes a statutory sanction on a political party that fails to comply with the membership-register requirement. Secondly, the effect of that sanction on candidates must be assessed in light of the constitutional requirement of party membership and sponsorship. That second question should neither be confused with personal disqualification nor dismissed merely because the statutory sanction is directed at the party.

INEC v Zenith Labour Party therefore leaves an important question for further judicial consideration: where a political party is legally ineligible to field candidates, what is the constitutional position of an otherwise qualified individual whose candidacy depends on that party's sponsorship? Any answer must preserve the Supreme Court's distinction between party ineligibility and personal disqualification, while recognising that, under Nigeria's electoral framework, the two may be legally distinct without being practically separable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in INEC v Zenith Labour Party affirms the statutory framework governing political party membership registers and underlines the importance of compliance with electoral legislation. Its distinction between a party's ineligibility to field candidates and an individual's personal disqualification is legally significant, but it also raises questions about the practical consequences of a party-level sanction.

In a system that requires party sponsorship for candidacy, a party's inability to field candidates may effectively foreclose the ambitions of otherwise qualified aspirants. The distinction between party ineligibility and individual disqualification must therefore be maintained without losing sight of the relationship between the two.

The challenge is to ensure that electoral compliance serves its objectives of transparency and internal party democracy, while the consequences of statutory breaches are understood in their full constitutional context. The judgment settles the validity of the challenged provisions; the implications of party-level sanctions for individual aspirants remain an open question in Nigeria's evolving electoral jurisprudence.